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III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to assignment from the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah made under authority of Utah 
Code Annotated 78-2A-3(2)(k), 1953 As Amended. The Supreme Court 
had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-
2(3)(i), 1953 As Amended. The transfer of the case was enabled on 
September 16, 1992 pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4), 1953 
As Amended. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Denial of Motion to Suppress. Did the Trial Court commit 
error by denying the Defendant's PreTrial Motion to Suppress 
Evidence obtained in a warrantless search and by allowing admission 
of said evidence at Trial. 
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Was the conviction of the 
Defendant supported by reliable evidence to reasonably support each 
element of the offense to the standard of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
3. Denial of Motion to Arrest Judgment, Did the Trial Court 
commit error by refusing to grant the Defendant's post trial Motion 
to Arrest Judgment. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14: 
Sec. 14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23. 
Arrest of Judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the 
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a 
commitment until the defendant is charged anew or 
retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Nature of Case. The Defendant appeals his conviction by 
a jury for Theft of Money, a third degree felony, in the First 
Judicial District Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
2. Statement of Facts, The Defendant and a Co-Defendant, 
Toya J. Reynolds, hereinafter referred to as Reynolds, were charged 
in an Information [R. 2-3] with Theft of Money from Drewes Floral 
on February 13, 1992 in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404, 
1953 As Amended1, 
Drewes Floral is a retail store located on Main Street in 
Brigham City, Utah, On February 13, 1992 an employee of the store, 
Shari Oiler, obtained cash from the local branch of the First 
Security Bank. When she returned to the store at about 11:00 a.m. 
with the cash, she observed the Defendant and the Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds, in the store. Ms. Oiler locked the cash in an office 
desk drawer. At about 2:00 that afternoon Ms. Oiler discovered 
that the desk drawer had been forced open and the money was gone 
[Trial Transcript, page 45, line 7 - page 46, line 1]. 
On the same afternoon at about 2:41 p.m. the Defendant and the 
Co-Defendant, Reynolds, were stopped by Salt Lake County Deputies 
outside of a thrift store located at approximately 3656 South State 
Street in Salt Lake City in connection with a reported attempted 
theft in the store. The Co-Defendant, Reynolds, was arrested for 
1
 An Amended Information was filed prior to Trial charging 
the same crime as the original offense [R. 134 - 135]. 
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a misdemeanor attempted purse snatching in the store and the 
Defendant was released as not being involved. The deputies 
searched the automobile in which the Defendant and Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds,.arrived at the thrift store. Keys to the car and its1 
glove compartment were obtained from the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, 
and cash which was later entered as exhibits 3 & 4 at the Trial of 
this matter, was obtained from the locked glove compartment. 
After arraignment in the District Court, the Defendant filed 
a Motion to Suppress [R. 67-68] with supporting Memorandum [R. 69-
75] requesting the Court to suppress evidence of the search of the 
vehicle and the evidence seized therefrom.2 The Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds, filed a similar Motion to Suppress and the Court held a 
combined Evidentiary Hearing on both Motions to Suppress on the 
30th day of April, 1992 [see April 30, 1992 Hearing Transcript, 
page 5 - 62]. The parties entered into an agreed set of facts at 
the Motion Hearing upon which Judge Judkins made his decision at 
the conclusion of the Hearing. The Court ruled that the search of 
the vehicle "was an inventory search pursuant to an impoundment" 
[4/30 Transcript, page 59, lines 14 - 15] and that the impoundment 
of the vehicle was unreasonable and therefor granted the Co-
Defendant, Reynolds, Motion to Suppress [4/30 Transcript, page 58, 
line 3 - page 62, line 2]. In ruling on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, the Court found "that defendant Scott was a passenger in 
the vehicle, that he arrived at the location of where the vehicle 
2
 The evidence was admitted at Trial as exhibits 2, 3, & 4 
and testimony from Gene C. Van Rosendahl, Scott Bannon, 
Chris Owenby, and Jim Cleverly. 
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was impounded as a passenger, and that he left certain items of 
personal property in the vehicle", but went on to rule that the 
Defendant did not have standing and therefor denied the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress [4/30 T., page 58, line 6 - page 59, line 3]. 
The State thereafter dismissed the case against Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds. 
The charge against the Defendant was tried to a jury beginning 
on June 29, 1992. The Defendant thereafter filed a Motion to 
Arrest Judgment [R. 171] and Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Arrest Judgment [R. 172-174]. Hearing on said Motion was held on 
July 23, 1992 at the conclusion of which the Trial Court denied the 
Motion [see July 23, 1992 Hearing Transcript, page 14, line 20 -
page 15, line 14]. The Court thereafter sentenced the Defendant to 
the Utah State Prison. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendant had standing to challenge the vehicle 
search and/or seizure of the evidence from the glove compartment of 
the vehicle, and his Motion to Suppress should therefor have been 
granted; and exhibits 2, 3, & 4, and testimony in relation to the 
search and seizure should have been excluded at Trial. 
a). The Defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle and/or the glove compartment and the Trial 
Court failed to address and take the expectation into account. 
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b). The Defendant had a possessory interest in the 
property seized from the glove compartment and the Court failed to 
take that interest into account. 
c). In interpreting Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution the Court should adopt the "legitimately on the 
premises11 standard created in the case of Jones vs. United States, 
362 US 257, 4 L Ed.2d 697, and/or the "target" theory whereby any 
criminal defendant at whom a search was directed would have 
standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the 
admission at Trial of evidence obtained as result of the search. 
2. The evidence presented at Trial was insufficient to 
establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasotable doubt. 
The Defendant's presumption of innocence was not overcome by proof 
of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
Defendant should have therefor been acquitted. 
a). There was a complete lack of evidence presented at 
Trial to establish whether the theft was committed; 1) by the 
Defendant solely, 2) by the Defendant acting in concert with the 
Co-Defendant, Reynolds, or 3) by the Co-Defendant acting without 
participation of the Defendant. The evidence at Trial equally 
supports either of the three (3) possibilities. 
3, The Trial Court in denying the Defendant's Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment failed to apply the proper standard in 
evaluating the evidence upon which the verdict was based and failed 
to make sufficient findings in support of its decision. 
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a). In ruling upon the Motion for Arrest of Judgment, 
the Trial Court should have determined that the inferences from the 
evidence equally pointed to a not guilty finding as well as a 
guilty finding* The inferences from the evidence equally support 
the finding that: 1) the Defendant committed the theft alone or, 
2) the Defendant committed the theft acting in concert with the Co-
Defendant, Reynolds, or 3) the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, committed 
the theft without the participation of the Defendant. The evidence 
upon which the jury inferred the Defendant's guilt was so 
inherently improbable that no reasonable mind could have based a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt thereon. 
b). That the Trial Court in announcing its decision to 
deny the Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment failed to make 
adequate finding explaining its decision. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
1. Standing to Challenge Illegal Search. The Trial Court 
determined that the search of the vehicle was an inventory search 
incident to impoundment of the vehicle, but that the impoundment of 
the vehicle was not authorized; and therefor, the search and 
seizure of evidence was in violation of Fourth Amendment 
guarantees; and therefor, granted the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, 
Motion to Dismiss [4/30 T. page 59, line 4 - page 62, line 2]. But 
for the Trial Court's determination of the Defendant's lack of 
standing, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress would also have been 
granted. 
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The Court initially ruled on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and found that the Defendant lacked standing at the 
conclusion of the Motion Hearing on April 30, 1992. The Court 
ruling and reasons therefor, are contained in the transcript of 
said Hearing beginning at page 58, line 6 and ending at page 59, 
line 3. 
The Defendant thereafter filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
addressing the specific issue of standing [R. 113-118] and the 
Court after receiving the Supplemental Memorandum, re-addressed the 
Motion to Suppress immediately before Trial [Trial T. page 4, 
lines 4-16] and ruled; "And for the reasons previously stated this 
Court has not been persuaded any differently from the original 
position the Court took by (sic) the Memorandums and therefore will 
deny those Motions to quash and to suppress". 
a). Expectation of Privacy. As stated by this Court in 
State vs. Rowe 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) the capacity, 
"standing" to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends 
on whether the persoi* claiming the protection has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Also see: Katz vs. 
United States 389 US 347, 19 L Ed.2d 576; Rakas vs. Illinois 439 US 
128, 58 L Ed.2d 387. 
The Trial Court did not address the Defendant's 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or the glove 
compartment of the vehicle. The fact that the Defendant had left 
certain items in the vehicle and the fact that the vehicle had been 
left locked is some evidence of an expectation of privacy by the 
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Defendant even though he was simply a passenger. It is clear that 
many passengers in vehicles who leave items in a vehicle such as 
stereos, boom boxes, purses, or money request the driver of the 
vehicle to lock the vehicle and have a strong expectation of 
privacy therein. 
In regard to the money seized from the locked glove 
compartment, the only reason that the State proposed to present it 
at Trial was to show that the Defendant had some possessory 
interest in the stolen money to imply that he had committed the 
theft. The possibility of a possessory interest in the Defendant, 
the fact that the glove compartment had been left locked, are 
strong indications of an expectation of privacy in the Defendant. 
The Trial Court clearly erred by not addressing the Defendants 
expectation of privacy. 
b). Possessory Interest in Property Seized. It is a 
well settled proposition that a possessory interest in the property 
seized confers standing to challenge the seizure by a Motion to 
Suppress, Katz vs. United States supra, Rakas vs. Illinois supra, 
and State of Utah vs. Rowe supra, and Jones vs. United States 362 
US 257, 4 L Ed.2d 697. 
It likewise has been held in the case of United 
States vs. Jeffers 342 US 48, 96 L Ed. 59, that the fact that goods 
in which a Defendant asserts a proprietary interest or contraband 
does not defeat his standing to question the constitutionality of 
seizure thereof. 
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As pointed out above, the only relevancy of the 
seized money in this case, is the implication that the Defendant 
had a possessory interest or claim to the money, thereby implying 
that he stole the same from Drewes Floral. The State should not be 
allowed to have it both ways, either the Defendant had a possessory 
interest in the property seized from the locked glove compartment 
giving him standing to contest the seizure or he had no interest in 
the money and the evidence should not have been admitted at Trial 
against him. 
c). Interpretation of Article I. Section 14 Utah State 
Constitution. Although the language of Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution is the same as the language of the Fourth 
Amendment, this Court is not bound by the interpretation given the 
Fourth Amendment when interpreting Article I, § 14. 
This Court should give an expansive interpretation 
of Article I, § 14 such as that given by the eight members of the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Jones vs. United States 
supra, said interpretation being referred to as the "target" theory 
by the five members of the Supreme Court in Rakas vs. Illinois 
supra. This Court should follow the Jones language which states: 
In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful 
search and seizure1 one must have been a victim of a 
search or seizure, one against whom the search was 
directed, 
This Court should reject the restrictive 
interpretation given by the five member majority in the Rakas vs. 
Illinois supra case and instead follow the four dissenters in the 
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Rakas case which urges the continued use of the "legitimately on 
the premises" standard. 
2. Insufficiency of Evidence. The standard of review which 
this Court should apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence upon which the Defendant was convicted, was set out by 
this Court in State vs. Singer 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App, 1991) as 
follows: 
When reviewing whether evidence is sufficient 
to support a jury conviction, 
we review the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. Also see 
State vs. Petrel, 659 P.2d 443, 
(Utah 1983). 
In this case inferences which can be drawn from the 
evidence presented at Trial points at least as equally strong at 
not guilty as at guilty. The evidence does not establish that the 
Defendant committed the theft alone, or that the Defendant 
committed the theft along with the Co-Defendant, Reynolds. The 
only clear inference is that the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, committed 
the theft. The evidence presented at Trial from testimony of 
employees of Drewes Floral, Shari Oiler [Trial T. page 28-55], 
Pauline Barnes [Trial T. page 156-178], and Teresa Buchanan [Trial 
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T. page 178-184] placed the Defendant and the Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds, at the store as follows: 
(1) When Shari Oiler returned to the store from the bank at 
around 11:00 a.m. with the money in the bag. She saw both the 
Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, in the store. The 
Defendant was coming out of the office and asked about an 
employment application. Both the Defendant and the Co-Defendant, 
Reynolds, were in a position to observe the money Ms. Oiler was 
carrying. The Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, were both 
at a counter in the store area when Ms. Oiler proceeded to go into 
the office to put the money in the desk drawer. Ms. Oiler 
discovered the money missing from the desk drawer about 2:00 p.m. 
(2) When Ms. Oiler returned with the money Pauline Barnes, in 
referring to the Defendant and Co-Defendant, Reynolds, stated, "I 
just saw them in the shop. I really didn't notice what they were 
doing. I just knew that they were still looking around our shop 
looking around." [Trial T. page 164, lines 16-18]. Ms. Barnes says 
they were in the store about twenty (20) minutes. 
(3) Teresa Buchanan observed the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, in 
the store and answered his inquiries regarding flowers. She never 
saw the Defendant in the store. 
The only evidence presented at Trial which could connect the 
Defendant to the stolen money came from the testimony of the Salt 
Lake County Deputies; Gene C. Van Rosendahl [Trial T. page 55-73], 
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Scott Bannon [Trial T. page 74-100], and Chris Owenby [Trial T. 
page 100-118] as follows: 
(1) The Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, traveled to 
the thrift store in Mr. Reynold's fatherfs or grandfather's 
automobile. 
(2) The automobile was parked outside of the thrift store at 
about 2:41 p.m., when the deputies arrived, with its' doors locked. 
(3) The keys to the automobile were recovered from the Co-
Defendant, Reynolds, pocket and the car was unlocked by the 
deputies. 
(4) The money, appearing to be the stolen money, was in the 
automobile locked in the glove compartment. The key to unlock the 
glove compartment was also recovered from the Co-Defendant, 
Reynold's, pocket. 
(5) That the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, in response to 
questioning by Deputy Owenby, claimed ownership of the money [Trial 
T. page 113, line 4 - page 114, line 10 and page 116, line 20 -
page 117, line 3]. There is a fairly strong inference that the Co-
Defendant, Reynolds, participated in the theft because of his claim 
of ownership of the money. No such inference can be drawn from any 
of the evidence in relation to the Defendant in this matter. The 
Defendant's presumption of innocence clearly has not been overcome 
by the evidence in this case. 
3. Ruling on Motion in Arrest of Judgment. The Defendant 
made a Motion for Arrest of Judgment under Rule 23, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The Motion was argued at the Hearing on 
13 
July 23, 1992 [7/23 Hearing T. page 2-15]. The Utah Courts have 
clearly set out the standard by which such Motions shall be judged, 
State vs. Mevers 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980), State vs. Workman 806 
P.2d 1198.(Utah App. 1991). 
This Court clearly set out the standard in the Workman 
case in the following quote from the Meyers case: 
[A] court has the right, and indeed should 
exercise the duty, to arrest a judgment after 
a jury verdict in an appropriate case. . . 
In short, the legal mechanism of 
arresting a judgment is a firmly entrenched 
exception to the rule of law in a proper case 
that jurors are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
For an appellate court, or a trial court, 
as is the case, here, to substitute its 
judgment for that of the jury, the verdict 
must be based on evidence lfso inherently 
improbable that no reasonable mind could 
believe it." Id. (citations omitted). Under 
such circumstance, an arrest of judgment is 
appropriate. 
At the Conclusion of the July 23 Hearing the on Motion 
the Trial Court denied the Motion ruling at page 14, line 24 - page 
15, line 14, as follows: 
In this particular case I feel the standard is 
whether or not there was sufficient evidence 
that was submitted or introduced that may lead 
the jury to determine that all of the elements 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, 
if there wasn't sufficient evidence that was 
submitted, then this court has to determine 
that and then the court would arrest judgment. 
In this particular case, the court finds 
that there was evidence submitted to support 
each of the elements. Ifm not saying whether 
that is beyond a reasonable doubt or not. 
That's up to the jury. My job in determining 
this is as to whether or not there was 
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evidence submitted which would support their 
verdict. I find that there was. Therefore, 
your motion to arrest judgment is denied . . . 
The Trial court in making its ruling did not address the 
quality of the evidence and/or the inferences which were 
appropriate to be drawn therefrom. Particularly the evidence from 
which the jury inferred that the Defendant, participated in the 
theft with the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, or why an equally strong 
inference could not be drawn that the Defendant did not participate 
in the theft. 
The Trial Court's ruling does not provide any explanation 
in ruling to insure that the Trial Judge followed that standard 
required in ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion this Court should find that the Defendant had 
standing to challenge the illegal search and/or seizure because he 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy and/or because he had a 
possessory interest in property contained in the vehicle, including 
the property seized. The evidence of the search and/or seizure 
should therefor be suppressed as in the Co-Defendant, Reynolds 
case. 
Secondly, this Court should determine that the evidence upon 
which the Defendant was convicted was insufficient to sustain the 
conviction. That the inferences to be drawn from the evidence 
equally supported a finding of not guilty as a finding of guilty 
and the Defendant therefor should be acquitted. 
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Thirdly, it should be determined that the Trial Court did not 
apply the proper standard in reviewing the Defendant's Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment and/or did not issue an appropriate decision 
explaining the Trial Court's finding and this Court should therefor 
remand for further determination of the Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment. 
WHEREFORE the Defendant requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction and dismiss the case against him, or in the alternative 
to remand for a new Trial, and/or for further proceedings on the 
Motion in Arrest of Judgment* 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1993. 
•-- - ass 
Jack H. Molgard 
Attorney for the Appellant 
102 South 100 West 
P. 0. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
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